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Abstract 
 
This study finds that firms that follow excessive payout policies (over-payers) have 
significantly higher financial distress risk and lower survival compared to under-payers. 
Moreover, ceteris paribus, institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon influence 
firms into over-paying. Our findings, which are robust to a range of financial distress measures 
and alternative definitions of over-payment, are consistent with risk shifting by long-term 
investors. The link between over-payment, distress risk, and reduced firm survival persists 
across alternative matching estimators that reduce the impact of observable confounding 
effects. Following the extant literature, we study the investment choices of indexer institutional 
investors to address potential endogeneity in the institutional investment and payout policy 
relation.  
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³It concerns us that, in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away from 
LQYHVWLQJ LQ WKH IXWXUH JURZWK RI WKHLU FRPSDQLHV«Too many companies have cut capital 
expenditure and even increased debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks. Many 
commentators lament the short-term GHPDQGV RI WKH FDSLWDO PDUNHWV«:H VKDUH WKRVH
concerns, and believe it is part of our collective role as actors in the global capital markets to 
FKDOOHQJHWKDWWUHQG«We certainly believe that returning cash to shareholders should be part 
of a balanced capital strategy; however, when done for the wrong reasons and at the expense 
RIFDSLWDOLQYHVWPHQWࣟLWFDQjeopardize DFRPSDQ\¶VDELOLW\WRJHQHUDWHVXVWDLQDEOHORQJ-term 
UHWXUQV´ Larry Fink CEO of BlackRock, Open letter to shareholders, Reuters and Wall Street 
Journal, March 26, 2014. 
 
1. Introduction 
The current focus of market participants is on payout levels with the financial press1 
anticipating that the shareholders of the biggest US companies will receive $1tn during 2015, 
a new record in corporate payouts. The steep increase in corporate payouts has led the chief 
economist of the Bank of England to voice his concerns on its adverse effect on long-term 
investment and WKHLPSOLHGLQFUHDVHLQILUPV¶GLVFRXQWUDWHV (Haldane, 2015), which together 
should raise firm risk. In this paper, we argue that in order to understand trends in payout 
policy, their determinants and impact on firm risk, one should focus on excessive payout 
policies. It is overpayment that could lead to a significant reduction in liquid assets and retained 
earnings, which reduces financial flexibility and increases distress risk. By building a simple 
model of optimal payout based on standard accounting, financial, and market variables, we 
                                                 
1
 ³6KDUHKROGHUV LQ WKH ELJJHVW 86 FRPSDQLHV VWDQG WR UHFHLYH D UHFRUG WQ LQ FDVK WKLV \HDU DV EOXH FKLSV¶
concerns over the global economic outlook have diverted cash away from investment and is driving a boom in 
buybacks and dividends.´± Platt and MacKenzie (2015) 
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identify over-payers and examine their distress risk as well as their future survival compared 
to under-payers. We then look at shareholder preferences regarding excessive payout policies 
and offer evidence consistent with the risk shifting incentives of long-term institutional 
investors driving overpayment.  
Prior academic work on the relation between payout policy and firm risk focuses almost 
exclusively on the level of (or change to) payout and refrains from investigating the potential 
costs of excess payouts. For example, there is comprehensive evidence that the initiation or 
increase of dividends conveys information to the market that market risk (Grullon et al., 2002; 
v.Eije et al., 2014) or default risk (Charitou et al., 2011) is reduced and is a strong indicator of 
sustainable earnings, dividend payments, and growth (Lintner, 1956; DeAngelo et al., 2006). 
Similarly, Lee et al. (2011) show an inverse relationship between dividends and firm risk. 
However, given the negative impact of excess payouts on financial flexibility one would expect 
a positive relation between overpayment and distress risk. Prior evidence supports this 
conjecture. Chen and Wang (2012) report that financially constrained firms have a significant 
increase in distress risk following their buyback announcement compared to unconstrained 
firms. Maxwell and Stephens (2003) find that larger buyback programs lead to greater negative 
bond price reactions, which they interpret as evidence of wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders. They also find that this wealth transfer is more pronounced in firms with higher 
distress risk. Pryschepa et al. (2013) show that financially distressed firms which are not yet 
identified as such by the market are less likely to reduce their payouts to shareholders, hence 
continue transferring wealth from creditors to shareholders. In other words, shareholders have 
VWURQJULVNVKLIWLQJLQFHQWLYHVUHODWHGWRWKHILUP¶VSD\RXWSROLF\:HXVHWKLVIUDPHZRUNLQ
explaining overpayment.  
Dividend payouts benefit shareholders against debtholders as firms transfer wealth from 
the latter to the former (Bulan and Hull, 2013) and the ability of shareholders to extract rents 
4 
 
from other claimholders gives them an advantage as the probability of default increases 
(Garlappi et al., 2008). Harford et al. (2015) find that firms with long-term institutional 
investors increase their payouts, which is similar to Grinstein and Michaely¶V (2005) findings 
on share repurchases. ,QVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶LQYHVWPHQWKRUL]RQVDUHLPSRUWDQWLQWKLVFRQWH[W
since long-term institutional inveVWRUVKDYHD³VWURQJYRLFH´LQDILUP$JKLRQHWDO
therefore managers cater to their preferences (Gaspar et al., 2012).  
Contrary to long-term institutional investors, short-term institutional investors place 
greater emphasis on short-term performance and earnings leading to misvaluations (Bushee, 
2001); have less incentives to invest resources for monitoring and time for learning about a 
firm (Gaspar et al., 2005); invest more in firms with disclosure improvements leading to an 
increase in stock volatility (Bushee and Noe, 2000); and adopt more aggressive and short-term 
trading strategies that can push managers to adopt a myopic behaviour (Bushee and Goodman, 
2007). Meanwhile, long-term institutional investors have the resources and motivation for 
better monitoring managers (Harford et al., 2015), hold on average well-diversified portfolios 
(Bushee, 1998; 2001), and are not significantly affected by corporate disclosure practices 
(Bushee and Noe, 2000). Therefore, long-term institutional investors are likely to be rather 
insensitive to firm specific risk and are expected to have very strong risk shifting incentives.  
Using the above arguments, we analyze all publicly listed US firms from 1975 to 2013 
and employ a set of variables established in the payout literature to identify firms that pay out 
more (less) than expected, based on the optimal payout model we construct. We label these 
firms as over-payers (under-payers). We recognize that there is no unambiguous model of 
³RSWLPDO´SD\RXWWKHUHIRUHwe use several definitions of overpayment to classify our firms. 
Moreover, we hypothesize that and test whether over-paying can serve as a strong indicator of 
financial distress and reduced firm survival. To do so we employ a comprehensive set of 
accounting-based and market-based financial distress and involuntary delisting measures. Our 
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findings suggest that over-paying firms are on average higher on the financial distress risk 
spectrum and have a shorter life span as opposed to under-paying firms. The findings we report 
are also economically significant as the average over-payer has a market capitalization, at 
December 2013 prices, of $1.8bn with more than double the average default probability, based 
on Bharath and Shumway's (2008) Merton's distance to default model, of 5.31% for over-
payers compared with 2.3% for under-payers.  
Having identified those firms that over-pay and their association with financial distress 
and survivability, we turn our focus on the determinants of the decision to over-pay. We find 
that long-term institutional investors increase the likelihood of overpayment. A one standard 
deviation increase in the shareholdings of long-term institutional investors leads to a 2.6% 
increase in the likelihood of a firm becoming an over-payer. In contrast, short-term investors 
decrease the likelihood of overpayment, consistent with their loss-aversion behavior. Our 
findings suggest that firms cater to their long-term institutional investors by overpaying even 
if that translates into being higher on the financial distress spectrum. Given that long-term 
institutional investors have strong risk shifting incentives, our findings are consistent with risk 
shifting being an important driver of overpayment. 
In order to support this conjecture we control for competing hypotheses and find that our 
results regarding shareholder risk shifting preferences remain intact. In particular, we explore 
whether catering to VKDUHKROGHUV¶ time varying demands (Baker et al., 2011; Kulchania, 2013) 
and peer pressure (Popadak, 2014) influence firms into becoming over-payers. We find that 
both effects have significant impact on excess payouts. For example, a one standard deviation 
increase in the dividend premium is associated with an increase in the likelihood to over-pay 
by 5.8%. However, our results regarding the impact of institutional investor horizons remain 
unchanged.  
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We acknowledge that our results may be sensitive to possible misclassification of over-
payers as well as potential confounding effects driving the relation between overpayment and 
financial distress. Furthermore, the investment choices of institutional investors could be 
endogenous to firm payout policy, which could lead to spurious results. We address each of 
these problems using a series of robustness tests. To avoid misclassifying over-payers, we not 
RQO\ORRNDWWKRVHILUPVWKDWGHYLDWHPDUJLQDOO\IURP³RSWLPDO´SD\RXWOHYHOVEXWDOVRFODVVLI\
our cross-section into tercile portfolios. This tercile portfolio classification is based on the 
residuals of the optimal payout model and define as over-payers only the firms that belong to 
WKHKLJKHVWWHUFLOHSRUWIROLR$GGLWLRQDOO\LQRUGHUWRHQVXUHWKDWZHLGHQWLI\³persistent´RYHU-
payers we alternatively define them as firms that pay above the expected payout for three 
consecutive years. Regarding confounding effects affecting the reported relation between 
overpayment and distress risk, we use a range of distress risk measures to confirm our findings. 
These measures are bound to be affected differently by omitted observable characteristics, 
therefore the fact we get consistent results across these different specifications reduces the 
probability that some common omitted factor is driving the relation. More importantly, we run 
a covariate matching method to match over-payers to under-payers and our results remain 
unchanged. This alleviates the concern of omitted observable factors driving our results. 
Finally, in order to mitigate the impact of endogeneity in the institutional investor-payout 
relation, we follow the extant literature (e.g., Harford et al., 2015) and use the holdings of quasi-
indexer institutional investors to confirm our findings. Quasi-indexers are typically passive 
long-term investors that do not self-select into particular investments based on firm 
characteristics, e.g., payout policy, given that they have to mimic an index. Because of their 
inability to actively shift their portfolios they have strong incentives to affect firm policy 
(Appel et al., 2015). We find that quasi-indexer institutional investors have a significant 
influence in the decision to over-pay. A one standard deviation increase in ownership by quasi-
7 
 
indexers is associated with an increase in the probability of a firm becoming an over-payer by 
approximately 8.5%. Moreover, dedicated investors also increase the likelihood of a firm 
becoming an over-payer. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in ownership by 
dedicated investors increases the likelihood of over-paying by 2.5%. Our results, support Appel 
et al. (2015) wKRDUJXHWKDWSDVVLYHLQYHVWRUVHYHQWKRXJKWKH\FDQQRW³YRWHZLWKWKHLUIHHW´
and exit investments they still have a ³YRLFH´DQGLQIOXHQFHILUPVGHFLVLRQVGiven that our 
findings are confirmed for quasi-indexers, we argue that our main results are not driven by 
investors self-selecting into investing in overpaying firms.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and presents the descriptive 
statistics. Section 3 develops the baseline empirical model. Section 4 discusses the results on 
the relationship between over-payers and financial distress. Section 5 provides the results on 
the model sensitivity. Section 6 discusses the channel that explains the decision to over-pay. 
Section 7 concludes.  
2. Sample and Data 
2.1 Data 
We construct our sample by including all publicly traded U.S. firms in the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) / Compustat merged (CCM) database between 1975 and 2013. 
Following the extant literature, we exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC 
codes 4900-4949), and securities other than common stock. We identify dividends as the dollar 
value of common dividends (Compustat item DVC). Repurchases is estimated as purchase of 
common and preferred stock (Compustat item PRSTKC) minus the reduction in the book value 
of preferred stock (Compustat item PSTKRV). Total payout is estimated as the sum of 
dividends and repurchases. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Dittmar, 2000; Leary and 
Michaely, 2011; Desai and Jin, 2011; Bonaimé et al., 2013), we scale dividends, share 
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repurchases, and total payout by market capitalization. We consider market capitalization 
preferable to the book value of total assets or earnings since our objective is to reliably identify 
companies that provide comparatively larger or small payouts. Compared to total assets, market 
capitalization reflects relevant information in a more timely manner, including information on 
intangible assets. Earnings are problematic since they can also be negative, implying that the 
payout variable may not be defined. CCM also contains the information we need to construct 
all firm level control variables, other than institutional ownership. We also use the dividend 
premium from Kulchania (2013)2 estimated as the annual difference of the logs of the average 
market-to-book (M/B) ratios between payers and non-payers of dividends, as in Baker and 
Wurgler (2004). The total payout estimation sample extends until 2008 to allow the analysis of 
DILUP¶VGHOLVWLQJSUREDELOLW\RYHUDOHDGLQJILYH-year period on a rolling basis with 2013 being 
the final year of the analysis. The final sample results to 76,392 firm-year observations 
comprising of 11,510 unique U.S. industrial firms between 1975 and 2008.  
For the institutional ownership data we use the universe of the Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (13F) database to collect quarterly institutional holdings during the 
1981-2008 period. Thomson-Reuters collects information contained in Form 13F proxy 
statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). All institutional investors 
with $100m or more in assets under management are by law required to file the 13F form with 
the SEC. The Thomson-Reuters data help us not only calculate ownership levels for different 
institutional investor classifications but also to construct the investor turnover measures used 
in Gaspar et al. (2005; 2013) IRUFDSWXULQJLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶LQYHVWPHQWKRUL]RQVIn order 
to enhance the information on institutional investor types and investment styles, we merge the 
                                                 
2
 In alternative estimations, untabulated for brevity, we use the payout premia estimated as the annual differences 
in the logarithms of the value-weighted market-to-book ratios (M/B) of payers and non-payers of dividends and 
share repurchases, as reported in Kulchania (2013). The results remain unaltered.  
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13F GDWD ZLWK %ULDQ %XVKHH¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRU FODVVLILFDWLRQV3 All relevant variables 
included in this paper are defined in the Appendix.  
2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 shows the historical trends of corporate payouts scaled by market capitalization. 
We observe that total corporate payouts declined during the early 1990s and 2000s. Since then, 
total payouts have an upward trend surpassing the historical highs of the late 1970s. Moreover, 
dividends have declined steadily and stabilizing towards the late 2000s, with share repurchases 
driving mostly the corporate payouts. In terms of ownership (Figure 2), institutional investors 
show a persistent increase in their shareholdings, though dedicated institutional investors have 
remained relatively stable since 1981. Meanwhile, the turnover of institutional investors has 
declined from a high of approximately 22% in 1983 to 15% in 1990, after which it peaked at 
approximately 23% and 22% in 1996 and 2007 respectively.  
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the variables4 used in this paper. Panel A 
shows that across our sample period firms pay out on average approximately 2.3% of their 
market capitalization to their shareholders, of which around 1% is paid in the form of cash 
dividends and 1.3% in the form of share repurchases. Panel B shows that the average firm has 
a leverage ratio of 0.18, 12.26% of cash holdings, a market-to-book ratio of 1.7, and is publicly 
trading for an average of 14 years. Interestingly, the average retained earnings are negative at 
-11.62% while the median retained earnings are positive at 16.33%.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In order to assess financial distress we employ a comprehensive array of established 
accounting-based and market-based measures of risk and financial distress. Panel B reports the 
descriptive statistics of the financial distress measures we use in this study. The average interest 
                                                 
3
 Available at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html 
4
 All variables, with the exception of binary variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails.  
10 
 
coverage ratio is approximately 2.17. In addition, following Brockman et al. (2010) and 
Pryschepa et al. (2013) we use the Z-score dummy5 ± based on $OWPDQ¶V=-score with 1.81 
being the cut-off value. The average Z-score dummy of our sample is 0.84, similar to Brockman 
et al. (2010). As alternative financial distress measures we consider =PLMHZVNL¶VVFRUH
and 2KOVRQ¶V  O-score with the average values in our sample being -1.18 and -3.76 
respectively.  Consistent with Bharath and Shumway (2008), ZH DOVR HVWLPDWH 0HUWRQ¶V
distance to default and respective default probability; the average distance to default is 6.42 
similar to Anantharaman and Lee (2014) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010). Following 
Derrien et al. (2014), we also estimate the Campbell et al. (2008) CHS-score and associated 
default probability (CHS) with the mean values being -6.92 and 1.96 respectively.  
We also examine DILUP¶VPRUWDOLW\DQGVXUYLYDOLQUHODWLRQWRLWVSD\RXW7KHUHIRUHZH
consider both voluntary and involuntary delistings over a five year period following year t in 
our sample firms. Following Bhattacharya et al. (2015), for voluntary delistings we assess the 
payout policies for firms that are involved in (a) mergers and acquisitions; and (b) exchange 
transactions. For involuntary delistings we assess the payout policies for firms that are (c) 
liquidated, where firms are forced to cease operations and sell their assets; (d) dropped from a 
stock exchange, where firms are dropped for reasons other than liquidation or voluntary 
delisting; and (e) a combination of firms that are liquidated or dropped from the exchange, as 
in Bhattacharya et al. (2015). The average voluntary delisting over a five-year period due to 
mergers and exchange transactions is 0.1873 and 0.0097 respectively. However, the focus of 
our study is on involuntary delistings. The average firm-year liquidation and dropping from the 
exchange is 0.0027 and 0.1379 respectively, with the combined group being at 0.1406 over the 
period 1975 to 2013. 
                                                 
5
 We use the Z-score dummy which is a binary variable WKDWHTXDOVRQHLI$OWPDQ¶V z-score is higher than 
1.81 and zero otherwise:HGRWKLVGXHWRWKHVNHZQHVVRIWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRI$OWPDQ¶V=-score in our sample.  
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As shown in Panel C, across our sample period institutional investors have an average 
ownership of 34.61% with a mean portfolio turnover of 19.21%, similar to that reported in 
Gaspar et al. (2012) and Derrien et al. (2013). When splitting institutional investors based on 
their investment horizons we see that institutional ownership is mostly driven by mid- and 
high-turnover investors with an average ownership of 15.26% and 12.44% respectively. 
Moreover, dedicated institutions hold on average 4.78%, though, it is the quasi-indexing 
institutional investors that hold a significant ownership of 22%.  
3. Identifying over-payers and under-payers. 
We employ a standard Tobit model to identify what is the expected payout based on a set of 
established variables commonly used in the literature (e.g. Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo 
et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2013; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005), hence rely on the following:  
ܲܽݕ݋ݑݐ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܽݏ݄ܨ݈݋ݓ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ െ ݐ݋ െ ܤ݋݋݇௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܨ݅ݎ݉ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௧൅ ߚସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܴ݁ݐܽ݅݊݁݀ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܥܽݏ݄ܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜ǡ௧൅ ߚ଻ܫ݀݅݋ݏݕ݊ܿݎܽݐ݅ܿܴ݅ݏ݇௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܵݕݏݐ݁݉ܽݐ݅ܿܴ݅ݏ݇௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଽܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧ 
Where Payout6 is the total payout measured as the sum of total common dividends and purchase 
of common and preferred shares minus the reduction in the book value of preferred stock. To 
be consistent with the literature (e.g. Dittmar, 2000; Leary and Michaely, 2011; Desai and Jin, 
2011; Bonaimé et al., 2013), payout is scaled by market capitalization. The payout determinants 
we use are: a) cash flow estimated as operating income divided by total assets; b) market-to-
book estimated as firm market value over total assets; c) firm size estimated as the natural log 
of inflation-adjusted market capitalization; d) leverage estimated as long-term debt plus long-
term debt due in one year over market capitalization; e) retained earnings deflated by total 
                                                 
6
 Our results remain unaltered to alternative specifications replacing total payout with dividends and buybacks 
respectively. We also replicate the model with one year lagged control variables and the results remain the same. 
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assets; f) cash holdings estimated as cash and short-term investments over total assets; g) 
idiosyncratic risk  estimated as the standard deviation of the residuals retrieved by regressing 
the daily stock returns in excess of risk free rate on the value-weighted market return; h) 
systematic risk estimated as the standard deviation of the predicted value retrieved by 
regressing the daily stock returns in excess of risk free rate on the value-weighted market 
return; and i) firm age estimated as the number of years IURPDILUP¶VILUVWDSSHDUDQFHLQ&563
Finally, we control for the 49 industries in Fama and French (1997) and year fixed effects, 
while the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results in Table 2 show that larger 
and more mature firms, with higher cash and retained earnings levels payout more to their 
shareholders. In addition, we find that value and lower growth stocks that have lower risk, both 
idiosyncratic and systematic risk, make larger payouts.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
If firm i makes no payout in year t we classify it as a non-payer. Based on the Tobit 
estimations on the expected and actual payout we classify each firm as an over-payer or under-
payer. For instance, if the residual ui,t is positive then we classify firm i at year t as an over-
payer and if it is negative we classify that firm as an under-payer7. Based on this classification 
method some firms may be marginally classified as over-payers or under-payers by 
construction. To ensure our results are robust we use an alternative classification method as 
well. In particular, we split the set of observations into equal terciles based on the model 
residuals and classify them into three main categories: under-payers, moderate-payers, and 
over-payers. Meanwhile, firms that make no payouts at year t are classified as non-payers. A 
firm may pay more than expected only once, either by miscalculation or on purpose. However, 
                                                 
7
 As explained above, we rely on market capitalization as the denominator of our payout variable in order to 
precisely identify over- and under-payers. In untabulated robustness tests, we repeat our analyses by additionally 
requiring that the residual from a model of total payout over total assets is also positive (negative) to classify a 
firm as an over-payer (under-payer) in a particular year. Similarly, we jointly consider residuals from models in 
which payouts are scaled by market capitalization and earnings. Overall, we obtain qualitatively similar findings.  
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we wish to identify purposeful over-payers. Therefore, we further ensure our results our robust 
and not driven from possible misclassification by classifying our sample firms based on the 
consistency of their payout policy. In particular, if a firm is identified by the Tobit estimations 
for three consecutive years as having the same relationship between actual and expected 
payout, we classify it into each of the following four categories: consistent non-payers, 
consistent under-payers, consistent over-payers, and other payers (unclassified) which includes 
all remaining observations.  
Table 3 provides the average actual and predicted payout yields for each classification of 
non-payers, moderate/unclassified-payers, under-payers, and over-payers. Our focal point is 
the over-payers and under-payers. The results show that firms classified as under-payers pay 
out significantly less than expected and especially for the mid-point and terciles classifications 
under-payers pay out almost half of the expected payout level. Moreover, it is clear that for the 
mid-point and terciles classification over-payers are expected to pay out less than under-payers. 
In fact, over-payers pay out almost double the expected payout level. Overall, these findings 
suggest that over-payers are firms that pay out excessive amounts of cash which are higher than 
the optimal payout amount suggested by their characteristics and are clearly distinguishable 
from under-payers.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
4. Over-payers, financial distress, and firm survival 
Dividend payouts benefit shareholders against debtholders as firms transfer wealth from the 
latter to the former (Bulan and Hull, 2013) and the ability of shareholders to extract rents from 
other claimholders gives them an advantage and leads to a lower equity risk as the probability 
of default increases (Garlappi et al., 2008). Moreover, an inverse dividend change during 
financial difficulties will signal the persistence of such difficulties (Charitou et al., 2011), while 
distress risk increases significantly following share repurchase announcements (Chen and 
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Wang, 2012). However, firms that are financially distressed but are not yet identified as such 
by the market are less likely to reduce their payouts (Pryschepa, 2013) while a slow reduction 
of dividends during market downturns can signal firm quality (Hull, 2013).  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
The previously reported relationship between firm payouts and financial distress leads us 
to assess whether over-payers (under-payers) have higher (lower) financial distress. Table 4 
reports the results from the univariate analysis for a number of financial distress risk measures 
across different classifications of firms: non-payers, moderate/unclassified payers, under-
payers, and over-payers. The focal point of our analysis is primarily the contrasting 
performance between over-payers and under-payers.  
The results show that across all risk measures, over-payers have significantly higher 
financial distress compared with under-payers. The same findings apply when classifying firms 
into terciles. In particular, we find that over-payers have consistently higher financial distress 
compared to under-payers, but also firms making moderate payouts. Firms that are persistent 
over-payers also have higher financial distress compared to persistent under-payers. For 
instance, for the mid-point classification, over-payers are on average 3% more likely to default, 
having more than twice the average default probability (5.3%) compared to under-payers 
(2.3%). Yet over-payers pay more than what the market would expect based on their publicly 
available characteristics. Overall, we find consistent evidence suggesting that over-payers are 
higher on the financial distress spectrum, with a caveat that this does not suggest a causality 
between over-payers and financial distress.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Since over-payers are more financially distressed we assess whether over-paying firms 
are more likely to delist compared to under-paying firms. The univariate tests in Table 5 show 
that firms that over-pay are more likely to merge over a five-year period following the payout 
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compared to under-payers. The results also show that non-payers on average delist and drop 
from the exchange more frequently compared to firms making payouts, which is expected as 
non-paying firms are typically smaller, riskier, and have higher growth as opposed to firms 
making payouts (DeAngelo et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2001). Most importantly though, 
the results show that firms that are forced into liquidation or drop from the exchange, 
suggesting involuntary delisting (Bhattacharya et al., 2015), are on average significantly more 
common among over-payers compared to under-payers. This suggests that over-payers are 
more likely to involuntarily delist and therefore have on average a shorter lifespan. In summary, 
the evidence shows that firms which over-pay are more financially distressed, and are more 
likely to involuntarily delist over a five-year period following the excess payout.  
5. Model sensitivity and covariate matching 
In order to address any potential issues of model sensitivity and selection bias we ensure the 
robustness of our results via adequate counterfactuals by matching each over-payer from our 
sample with a suitable set of under-payers. We use henceforth the mid-point classification as 
this allows for a larger sample-size and time-variant shift from over-paying to under-paying 
and the interpretation of the results is more intuitive. However, the results based on the other 
two classification, terciles and persistent, remain unaltered. We exclude from the sample of 
untreated firms those firms that do not pay dividends and/or buy back shares, as payers differ 
significantly from non-payers on a number of characteristics such as growth, age, profitability, 
size, cash reserves, and earned relative to contributed capital mix among others (Bulan et al., 
2007; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Banyi and Kahle, 2014; Fama and French, 2001). We match each 
firm year observation identified as over-payer (treated) with an under-payer (untreated) using 
a one-to-one nearest neighbor covariate matching method with replacement8 and based on the 
                                                 
8
 7KHPDWFKLQJLVSHUIRUPHGZLWKWKHFRPPDQG³36PDWFK´LQ6WDWD 
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expected level of payout (predicted). Alternatively, we repeat the matching process based on 
the similarity of the firm specific characteristics (all controls), relying on the non-binary 
independent variables in Table 2. Hence, we test whether there are still significant differences 
in financial distress and firm survival between over-payers and under-payers.  
The results in Table 6 show there is a significant reduction in bias owing to the matching 
procedure, resulting in a bias after the matching of 0.0007 when matched based on the expected 
payout (Panel A) and of 2.4248 based on all controls (Panel B). Moreover, with the exception 
of interest coverage, the results clearly show that the treatment effect of over-paying has a 
consistent and positive effect on financial distress and the likelihood that a stock is forced to 
be delisted from a stock exchange. Overall, this non-parametric quasi-experimental analysis 
shows that over-paying is associated with higher financial distress and risk of involuntary 
delisting.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
6. Determinants of over-paying 
Institutional investors can influence firms¶ GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ ZKHQ WKH\ DUH dedicated or 
transient investors (Aghion et al., 2013) DQGSDVVLYHLQYHVWRUVFDQDOVRLQIOXHQFHILUPV¶GHFLVLRQ
making by influencing corporate governance as they incur low monitoring costs (Appel et al, 
2015). Moreover, institutional investors select firms based on their dividend policy, while 
managers cater to the preferences of the institutional investors (Desai and Jin, 2011). Therefore, 
we assess whether institutional investors overall and the type of institutional investor, namely, 
dedicated and quasi-indexer influence firms into becoming over-payers. 
We employ a standard logit model where the dependent variable is a binary variable 
equal to one if a firm is an over-payer and zero if a firm is an under-payer based on the mid-
point classification method discussed earlier. Table 7 provides an overview of the intuitional 
ownership variables for firms making a payout (under-payers and over-payers). Overall, 
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institutional investors hold approximately 41% of firms that make a payout and their average 
portfolio turnover is approximately 19%. Moreover, long-term investors hold approximately 
8% with quasi-indexers having significantly higher holdings of approximately 27% of firms 
that make payouts to their shareholders.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The results from the logistic regression, provided in Table 8, show that overall, total 
institutional ownership reduces the likelihood of a firm becoming an over-payer. For instance, 
a one standard deviation increase in institutional invHVWRUV¶ VKDUHKROGLQJV GHFUHDVHV WKH
likelihood of over-paying by approximately 6%. However, after controlling for total 
institutional ownership, we find that a one standard deviation increase in ownership of long-
term investors increases the likelihood of over-paying by approximately 2.6%. Moreover, a 
one standard deviation decrease in investor turnover increases the likelihood of over-paying by 
approximately 2.2%. This suggests that, compared to short-term investors, long-term investors 
increase the likelihood of a firm becoming an over-payer. One explanation for this is that long-
term investors are confident of their monitoring skills and invest in firms that strive to signal 
their potential quality by over-paying, hence, attracting institutional investors. Another 
explanation is that long-term investors influence firms to increase their payouts to excessive 
OHYHOVZKLFKLQWXUQLQFUHDVHVILUPV¶ILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVV$OWHUQDWLYHO\ORQJ-term investors are 
aware that some firms they invest in have higher financial distress risk and therefore influence 
their payout decisions in order to transfer wealth from credit holders to shareholders as argued 
by Fan and Sundaresan (2000). We test which of the two explanations hold and control for self-
selection by including quasi-indexer institutional investors as in Harford et al. (2015). Since 
quasi-indexer investors track an index they do not shift their portfolios often nor do they 
actively choose the firms they invest in since they replicate the index. Therefore, they are not 
active investors but can have DVLJQLILFDQWLQIOXHQFHLQILUPV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJas shown by 
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Appel et al. (2015), which allows us to test whether long-term institutional investors select 
firms that are already over-payers or influence firms into over-paying.  
The results show that both dedicated and quasi-indexer institutional investors have a 
positive relationship with over-paying. A one standard deviation increase in ownership held by 
dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions increases the likelihood of over-paying by 
approximately 2.5% and 8.5% respectively. The results suggest that long-term investors 
influence firms into over-paying. Even though transient institutional investors are arguably 
linked with short-term performance, they are more loss-averse and may try to reduce the 
likelihood of over-paying (Li et al., 2014). Our findings are consistent with Harford et al. 
(2015) who find that investors with longer investor horizons push firms to increase their 
payouts to shareholders. Our results, are also in line with Faccio et al. (2011) who find that 
well diversified investors lead to greater corporate risk-taking as manifested in our results from 
the fact that quasi-indexers increase the likelihood of over-paying which is in turn linked to a 
higher default risk. Contrary to Aghion et al. (2013) suggesting that quasi-indexers do not have 
D³VWURQJYRLFH´WKDWFDQLQIOXHQFHILUPV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJZHILQGWKDWSDVVLYHLQYHVWRUVFDQ
also exert influence consistent with Appel et al. (2015). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
In Table 8, Models 5-8, we control for alternative explanations for over-paying, in order 
to lend further support to our conjectures regarding the influence of institutional ownership. 
Financially vulnerable firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to increase dividends 
when peer influence is high (Popadak, 2014). However, Leary and Roberts (2014) find that it 
is only small, non-dividend-paying, and financially constrained firms which want to build their 
reputation that are more sensitLYHWRSHHULQIOXHQFH0RUHRYHUILUPV¶GLYLGHQGSROLF\LQWHUPV
of dividend initiation and level of dividend payout is significantly driven by their geographical 
location and local shareholder clientele (Becker et al., 2011); remotely based firms have 
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stronger dividend recommitments and increase their dividend more often (John et al., 2011). 
Moreover, QHLJKERULQJ ILUPV FDQ VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQIOXHQFH ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLDO SROLF\ GHFLVLRQ
making (Gao et al., 2011). Therefore, we assess the influence of peer firms and location on the 
propensity to overpay. We do so by including the variable city propensity to overpay estimated 
as the average value of the binary variable over-payer for firms headquartered in the same city, 
excluding the firm under consideration. Also, we control for the influence of geographical 
clustering and include the variable industry propensity to overpay estimated as the average 
value of the binary variable over-payer for firms belonging in each of the Fama and French 
(1997) 49 industries, excluding the firm under consideration.  
%DNHUDQG:XUJOHUILQGWKDWILUPV¶GLYLGHQGSROLF\LVGULYHQE\WKHLULQYHVWRUV¶
time varying demands and cater to their needs. Moreover, the payout choice between dividends 
and buybacks is driven by the dividend and buyback premiums (Jiang et al., 2013), while a 
higher buyback premium relative to the dividend premium increases the likelihood of firms 
shifting to buybacks (Kulchania, 2013). We control for the influence of catering on the decision 
to over-pay and follow Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Kulchania (2013) by using the dividend 
premium in our analysis. 
Therefore, we assess whether peer influence, geographical clustering, and catering by 
controlling for dividend premium,9 influence the decision to over-pay. The results on peer-
influence and catering show there is a positive relationship with over-payers. In particular, a 
one standard deviation increase in within industry peer influence and geographical clustering 
increases the likelihood of a firm becoming an over-payer by approximately 4.6% and 0.6% 
respectively0RUHRYHUDKLJKHUSUHPLXPLQFUHDVHVDILUP¶VSURSHQVLW\WRRYHU-pay, as a one 
standard deviation increase in premium increases the likelihood to over-pay by approximately 
                                                 
9
 Since a higher share buyback premium relative to the dividend premium can influence firms into shifting to 
buybacks (Kulchania, 2013) we repeat our estimations (unreported) with the share buyback premium, instead of 
dividend premium due to their high correlation, and our results remain unaltered.  
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6%, suggesting that catering to shareholders is a significant driver in the decision to over-pay. 
Importantly, our results on institutional ownership remain unaffected after controlling for these 
alternative explanations. 
Overall, the results show that dedicated and passive institutional investors increase the 
likelihood of overpaying while over-paying firms are shown to have higher financial distress 
risk and on average shorter life-span. Meanwhile, peer-pressure and a higher dividend premium 
increase the likelihood of firms over-paying as they FDWHU WR WKHLU LQYHVWRUV¶ WLPH-variant 
demands.  
7. Conclusion 
Despite the rise of firm payouts over the years and the continuous pressure managers face there 
LV OLPLWHGHYLGHQFHRQ WKHSRWHQWLDOFRVWVRI³H[FHVVLYH´ OHYHOVRISD\RXWV such as financial 
inflexibility. With a comprehensive sample of all publicly-listed US firms we use a set of 
commonly accepted variables to identify firms that pay out more than expected, which we label 
as over-payers. We find that over-payers pay significantly more than expected. Moreover, we 
use a comprehensive set of accounting- and market-based financial distress variables and firm 
survival measures and find that over-payers face higher financial distress and are more likely 
to involuntarily delist. Our results are robust when matching over-payers with suitable under-
payers and show that over-payers have consistently higher financial distress and a shorter life 
span.  
Since there is evidence suggesting that investors can influence firms¶ payout policy, we 
test whHWKHULQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶RZQHUVKLSFDQEHDFKDQQHOWKDWH[SODLQVWKHILUPEHKDYLRU
of over-paying even though such payout policies are linked to higher distress and shorter life 
span. We test whether institutional ownership overall and the investors¶KRUL]RQLQIOXHQFHILUPV
into over-paying while controlling for peer-influence and geographical clustering. The results 
show that institutional investors overall, reduce the likelihood of overpaying. But, all else 
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equal, it is long-term investors that push firm into over-paying contrary to short-term investors 
who focus on short-term gains and performance and are more loss-averse, hence, discourage 
firms from over-paying. Finally, we find that quasi-indexers have a more pronounced effect on 
increasing the likelihood of over-paying, which is in turn linked to a higher default risk, 
suggesting that even though quasi-LQGH[HUVDUHSDVVLYH LQYHVWRUV WKDWGRQRWKDYHD³VWURQJ
YRLFH´VWLOOH[HUWVLJQLILFDQWLQIOXHQFHLQILUPV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ   
22 
 
References 
Aghion Philippe, John Van Reenen, and Luigi Zingales, 2013, Innovation and Institutional 
Ownership, American Economic Review, 103, 277±304. 
Allen, Franklin, Antonio E. Bernardo, and Ivo Welch, 2000, A Theory of Dividends Based on 
Tax Clienteles, Journal of Finance, 55, 2499-2536. 
Altman, Edward I., 1968, Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy, Journal of Finance 23, 589±609.  
Anantharaman, Divya, and Yong Gyu Lee, 2014, Managerial risk taking incentives and 
corporate pension policy, Journal of Financial Economics, 111, 328-351. 
Andres, Christian, Markus Doumet, Erik Fernau, and Erik Theissen, 2015. The Lintner model 
revisited: Dividends versus total payouts, Journal of Banking and Finance, (forthcoming)  
Appel, Ian R., Todd A. Gormley, and Donald B. Keim, 2015, Passive Investors, Not Passive 
Owners, Working Paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler, 2004, A catering Theory of Dividends, Journal of 
Finance, 59, 1125-1165. 
Banyi, L. Monica and Kathleen M. Kahle, 2014, Declining propensity to pay? A re-
examination of the lifecycle theory, Journal of Corporate Finance, 27, 345±366. 
%HFNHU%R=RUDQ,YNRYLüDQG6FRWW:HLVEHQQHU/RFDOGLYLGHQGFOLHQWHOHVJournal of 
Finance 66, 655±683. 
Benartzi, Shlomo, Roni Michaely, and Richard Thaler, 1997, Do Changes in Dividends Signal 
the Future or the Past? Journal of Finance, 52, 1007-1034. 
Bhattacharya, Utpal, Alexander Borisov, and Xiaoyun Yu, 2015, Firm Mortality and Natal 
Financial Care, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 50, 61-88.  
Blau, Benjamin M., and Kathleen P. Fuller, 2008, Flexibility and dividends, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 14, 133-152. 
23 
 
Bonaimé, Alice A., Kristine Watson Hankins, and Jarrad Harford, 2013, Financial Flexibility, 
Risk Management, and Payout Choice, Review of Financial Studies, 27, 1074-1101. 
Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas, 2008, Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, Journal of Finance, 63, 1729-1775. 
Brockman, Paul, Xiumin Martin, and Emre Unlu, 2010, Executive Compensation and the 
Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt, Journal of Finance, 65, 1123-1161. 
Bulan, Laarni, and Tyler Hull, 2013, The impact of technical defaults on dividend policy, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, 814-823. 
Bulan, Laarni, Narayanan Subramanian, and Lloyd Tanlu, 2007, On the Timing of Dividend 
Initiations, Financial Management, 36, 31-65. 
Bushee, Brian J., 1998, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment 
Behavior, Accounting Review, 73, 305±33. 
Bushee, Brian J., 2001, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run 
Value? Contemporary Accounting Research, 18, 207-246.  
Bushee, Brian J., and Christopher F. Noe, 2000, Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional 
Investors, and Stock Return Volatility, Journal of Accounting Research, 38, 171-202. 
Bushee, Brian J., and Theodore H. Goodman, 2007, Which Institutional Investors Trade Based 
on Private Information About Earnings and Returns? Journal of Accounting Research, 45, 
289-322. 
Campbell, J.Y., Jens Hilscher, Jan Szilagyi, 2008, In Search of Distress Risk, Journal of 
Finance 63, 2899-2939. 
Charitou, Andreas, Neophytos Lambertides, and Giorgos Theodoulou, 2011, Dividend 
Increases and Initiations and Default Risk in Equity Returns, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 46, 1521-1543. 
24 
 
Chava, Sudheer, and Amiyatosh Purnanandam, 2010, Is Default Risk Negatively Related to 
Stock Returns? Review of Financial Studies, 23, 2523-2559. 
Chen, Sheng-Syan, and Yanzhi Wang, 2012, Financial constraints and share repurchases, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 105, 311-331. 
Cornelli, Francesca, Zbigniew Kominek, and Alexander Ljungvist, 2013, Monitoring 
Managers: Does It Matter? Journal of Finance, 68, 431-481. 
DeAngelo, Harry, and Linda DeAngelo, 1990, Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An 
Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms, Journal of Finance, 45, 1415-1431. 
DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo, and René M. Stulz, 2006, Dividend Policy and the 
earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 81, 227-254. 
Derrien, François, Ambrus Kecskés, and David Thesmar, 2013, Investor Horizons and 
Corporate Policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48, 1755-1780.  
Desai, Mihir A., and Li Jin, 2011, Institutional tax clienteles and payout policy, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 100, 68-84. 
Dittmar, Amy K., 2000, Why do firms repurchase stock? Journal of Business, 73, 331-355. 
Eisdorfer, Assaf, 2008, Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms, 
Journal of Finance, 63, 609-637.  
Eric, Platt, and Michael MacKenzie, 2015, US companies on course to return $1tn to 
shareholders in 2015, Financial Times, April 12.  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2c1a34d8dfa511e4a06a00144feab7de.html#axzz3X634h4Bf. 
Faccio, Mara, Maria-Teresa Marchica, and Roberto Mura, 2011, Large Shareholder 
Diversification and Corporate Risk-Taking, Review of Financial Studies, 24, 3601-3641. 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1997, Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 43, 153±193. 
25 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 2001, Disappearing dividends: changing firm 
characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 31-43. 
Fan, Hua, and Suresh M. Sundaresan, 2000, Debt Valuation, Renegotiation, and Optimal 
Dividend Policy, Review of Financial Studies, 13, 1057-1099. 
Faulkender, Michael, and Rong Wang, 2006, Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of 
Cash, Journal of Finance, 61, 1957-1990. 
Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen, 1988, Financing constraints and 
corporate investment, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 141±195. 
Fuller, Kathleen P., and Michael A. Goldstein, 2011, Do dividends matter more in declining 
markets? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 457-473. 
Gao, Wenlian, Lilian Ng, and Qinghai Wang, 2011. Does corporate headquarters location 
matter for corporate financial policies? Financial Management 40, 113±138. 
Garlappi, Lorenzo, Tao Shu, and Hong Yan, 2008, Default Risk, Shareholder Advantage, and 
Stock Returns, Review of Financial Studies, 21, 2743-2778. 
Gaspar, Jose-Miguel, Massimo Massa, and Pedro Matos, 2005, Shareholder investment 
horizons and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 135-
165. 
Gaspar, Jose-Miguel, Massimo Massa, Pedro Matos, Rajdeep Patgiri, and Zahid Rehman, 
2012, Payout Policy Choices and Shareholder Investment Horizons, Review of Finance, 
17, 261-320. 
Grinstein, Yaniv, and Roni Michaely, 2005, Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy, Journal 
of Finance, 60, 1389-1426. 
Grullon, Gustavo, Roni Michaely, and Bhaskaran Swaminathan, 2002, Are Dividend Changes 
a Sign of Firm Maturity? Journal of Business, 75, 387-424. 
26 
 
Haldane, Andrew, 2015, Who owns a company? Speech available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/833.aspx 
Harford, Jarrad, Ambrus Kecskés, and Sattar Mansi, 2015, Do Long-Term Investors Improve 
Corporate Decision Making? Working Paper. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2505261 
Harris, E. Lawrence, Samuel M. Hartzmark, and David H. Solomon, 2015, Juicing the dividend 
yield: Mutual funds and the demand for dividends, Journal of Financial Economics, 116, 
433-451. 
Hull, Tyler J., 2013, Does the timing of dividend reductions signal value? Empirical evidence, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 22, 193±208. 
Jiang, Zhan, Kenneth A. Kim, Erik Lie, and Sean Yang, 2013, Share repurchases, catering, and 
dividend substitution, Journal of Corporate Finance, 21, 36-50. 
John, Kose, Anzhela Knyazeva, and Diana Knyazeva, 2011, Does geography matter? Firm 
location and corporate payout policy, Journal of Financial Economics, 101, 533-551. 
Kaplan, Steven, and Bernadette Minton, 2012, How Has CEO Turnover Changed? 
International Review of Finance, 12, 57-87. 
Kay, John, 2012, The Kay review of UK equity markets and long-term decision making, 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/kay-review-publishes-report-on-uk-
financial-sector.  
Kim, Kihun, and Jinho Byun, 2013, Dividend Catering, Investor Protection, and Sentiment: A 
Cross-Country Analysis, Working paper, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2323947. 
Kulchania, Manoj, 2013, Catering driven substitution in corporate payouts, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 21, 180-195. 
27 
 
Leary, Mark T., and Michael R. Roberts, 2014, Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial 
Policy? Journal of Finance, 69, 139-178. 
Leary, Mark T., and Roni Michaely, 2011, Determinants of Dividend Smoothing: Empirical 
Evidence, Review of Financial Studies, 21, 3197-3249. 
Lee, Cheng-Few, Manak C. Gupta, Hong-Yi Chen, and Alice C. Lee, 2011, Optimal payout 
ratio under uncertainty and the flexibility hypothesis: Theory and empirical evidence, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 483-501. 
Li, Sailu, Anan Zhuang, and Dmitry Shapiro, 2014, Dividend Payout Policy and Institutional 
Investors Ownership: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Working Paper, Belk College of 
Business.  
Li, Wei, and Erik Lie, 2006, Dividend changes and catering incentives, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 80, 293-308. 
Lintner, John, 1956, Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained 
earnings, and taxes, American Economic Review, 46, 97-113. 
Manconi, Alberto, and Massimo Massa, 2013, A Servant to Many Masters: Competing 
Shareholder Preferences and Limits to Catering, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 48, 1693±1716. 
Maxwell, William, and Clifford Stephens, 2003, The Wealth Effects of Repurchases on 
Bondholders, Journal of Finance, 58, 895-919. 
Merton, Robert C., 1974, On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates, 
Journal of Finance, 29, 449±470. 
Michaely, Roni, Richard H. Thaler, and Kent Womack, 1995, Price reactions to dividend 
initiations and omissions: Overreaction or drift? Journal of Finance, 50, 573-608. 
Mikkelson, Wayne H., and Megan M. Partch, 2003, Do persistent large cash reserves hinder 
performance? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 275-294. 
28 
 
Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984, Corporate financing and investment 
decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13, 187-221. 
Ohlson, James A., 1980, Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy, 
Journal of Accounting Research, 18, 109±131.  
Popadak, Jillian, 2014, Dividend payments as a response to peer influence, Working paper, 
Duke University. 
3RUWHU0LFKDHO&DSLWDO'LVDGYDQWDJH$PHULFD¶V)DLOLQJ&DSLWDO,QYHVWPHQW6\VWHP
Harvard Business Review, 70, 65±82. 
Pryschepa, Oksana, Kevin Aretz, and Shantanu Banerjee, 2013, Can investors restrict 
managerial behavior in distressed firms? Journal of Corporate Finance, 23, 222-239 
Rapp, Marc S., Thomas Schmid, and Daniel Urban, 2014, The value of financial flexibility and 
corporate financial policy, Journal of Corporate Finance, 29, 288-302. 
Skinner, Douglas J., 2008. The evolving relation between earnings, dividends, and stock 
repurchases, Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 582±609. 
The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, Accounting 
Review, 73, 305±33. 
von Eije, Henk, Abhinav Goyal, and Cal B. Muckley, 2014, Does the information content of 
payout initiations and omissions influence firm risks? Journal of Econometrics, 183, 222-
229. 
Yan, Xuemin, and Zhe Zhang, 2009, Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-
term Institutions Better Informed? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 893-924. 
Zmijewski, Mark E., 1984, Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial distress 
prediction models, Journal of Accounting Research 22, 59±82. 
  
29 
 
 
Figure 1. Payout yields over time. The graph shows the annual dividend yield, share 
repurchases, and total payout yield, scaled by market capitalization of US listed firms from 
1975 to 2008.  
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Figure 2. Institutional ownership and investor turnover over time. The graph shows the 
annual shareholdings of institutional investors from 1981 to 2008. The institutional ownership 
data are collected from the quarterly institutional holdings reported in the Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (13F) database. The institutional investor holdings and classifications 
are estimated by merging the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database with 
%ULDQ%XVKHH¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOinvestor classifications. The measure of investor turnover and the 
classifications of low, moderate and high turnover are estimated as in Gaspar et al. (2012).  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample used in this study. The main data source is the CRSP / Compustat merged database of firm-
level data for all US-listed firms during 1975-2013. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and securities 
other than common stock. Panel A reports the annual common dividends, share repurchases, and total payout (measure as the sum of dividends 
and share repurchases) scaled by capitalization. Also reported, are the variables used for identifying the expected payout estimated in Table 2. 
Panel B reports an array of alternative financial distress and firm survival (voluntary and involuntary delisting) measures. Panel C reports the 
institutional ownership variables from Thomson-5HXWHUV ,QVWLWXWLRQDO +ROGLQJV ) GDWDEDVH DQG %ULDQ %XVKHH¶V LQVWitutional investor 
classifications. The measure of investor turnover and the classifications of low, moderate and high turnover are estimated as in Gaspar et al. (2012). 
All variables, except binary variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails and are defined in the Appendix.  
 
Panel A. Payouts and Payout Controls 
 N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Total payout  76,392 0.0227 0.0015 0.0419 0.0000 0.2601 
Cash flow 76,392 0.0788 0.1184 0.1903 -0.9068 0.3661 
Market-to-book 76,392 1.7087 1.2905 1.2934 0.5821 8.6793 
Firm size  76,392 4.2795 4.1218 2.0969 0.0217 9.6440 
Leverage 76,392 0.1802 0.1371 0.1671 0.0000 0.6875 
Retained earnings 76,392 -0.1162 0.1633 1.0486 -6.3279 0.7817 
Cash holdings 76,392 0.1226 0.0590 0.1569 0.0002 0.7689 
Idiosyncratic risk 76,392 0.0372 0.0309 0.0230 0.0096 0.1286 
Systematic risk 76,392 0.0073 0.0059 0.0061 0.0001 0.0327 
Firm age 76,392 14.7198 10.0000 14.4223 1.0000 83.0000 
Panel B. Financial Distress and Firm Survival 
 
N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Interest coverage 56,088 2.1685 1.9233 1.0350 0.7584 5.9086 
Z-score-Dummy 76,392 0.8425 1 0.3642 0 1 
Zmijewski-score 76,392 -1.1788 -1.4454 1.8820 -4.1175 7.5445 
O-score 76,392 -3.7629 -4.1207 2.6351 -9.0832 6.5054 
Distance to default 76,392 6.4234 5.1752 5.5749 -1.7371 27.9035 
Default probability 76,392 6.7592 0.0000 18.9284 0.0000 95.8819 
CHS-score 76,392 -6.9231 -7.5094 1.8952 -9.1169 1.3044 
Default probability (CHS) 76,392 1.9630 0.0548 9.8732 0.0110 78.6575 
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Merger and acquisition (year +5) 76,392 0.1873 0 0.3901 0 1 
Exchange transaction (year +5) 76,392 0.0097 0 0.0981 0 1 
Liquidation (year +5) 76,392 0.0027 0 0.0516 0 1 
Exchange dropped (year +5) 76,392 0.1379 0 0.3448 0 1 
Liquidation and Exchange dropped (year 
+5) 
76,392 0.1406 0 0.3476 0 1 
Panel C. Institutional Ownership 
 
N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Institutional ownership 52,056 0.3461 0.2968 0.2709 0.0007 0.9523 
Investor turnover 52,056 0.1921 0.1899 0.0631 0.0446 0.4186 
Low turnover institutional ownership 52,056 0.0615 0.0385 0.0680 0.0000 0.3148 
Mid turnover institutional ownership 52,056 0.1526 0.1212 0.1368 0.0000 0.5366 
High turnover institutional ownership 52,056 0.1244 0.0844 0.1293 0.0000 0.5315 
Ownership of dedicated institutions 52,056 0.0478 0.0181 0.0648 0.0000 0.3026 
Ownership of quasi-indexer institutions 52,056 0.2200 0.1811 0.1805 0.0000 0.6761 
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Table 2. Payout Tobit models 
This table presents Tobit regression results on a panel data set of firm-year total payout and a set of 
established payout determinants for all US-listed firms during 1975-2008, as per the following equation:  
 ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܲܽݕ݋ݑݐ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܥܽݏ݄ܨ݈݋ݓ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ െ ݐ݋ െ ܤ݋݋݇௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܨ݅ݎ݉ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ߚସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܴ݁ݐܽ݅݊݁݀ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܥܽݏ݄ܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܫ݀݅݋ݏݕ݊ܿݎܽݐ݅ܿܴ݅ݏ݇௜ǡ௧ ൅ߚ଼ܵݕݏݐ݁݉ܽݐ݅ܿܴ݅ݏ݇௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଽܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧  
 
We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and securities other than 
common stock. All variables, except binary variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The regression includes industry and year controls. Industries 
are defined using the Fama and French (1992) 49 industries classification. We use standard errors 
clustered by firm to accommodate heteroskedasticity and within-firm autocorrelation. The robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
  Total payout  
    
Cash flow 0.0210*** 
 (0.0037) 
Market-to-book -0.0094*** 
 (0.0005) 
Firm Size 0.0058*** 
 (0.0003) 
Leverage -0.0019 
 (0.0029) 
Retained earnings 0.0061*** 
 (0.0009) 
Cash holdings 0.0251*** 
 (0.0029) 
Idiosyncratic risk -0.5930*** 
 (0.0315) 
Systematic risk -1.0180*** 
 (0.0749) 
Firm age 0.0005*** 
 (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0164*** 
 (0.0062) 
Industry & Year controls 9  
Observations 76,392 
Pseudo R2 -0.373 
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Table 3. Non-payers, under-payers, moderate-payers, and over-payers 
This table presents the average actual and predicted payout yields for all US-listed firms during 
1975-2008. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and 
securities other than common stock. The mean payout yield is the total payout of firm i at year 
t, measured as the sum of total common dividends and purchase of common and preferred 
shares minus the reduction in the book value of preferred stock, scaled by market capitalization. 
The predicted payout yield is the residual ui,t estimated from the Tobit regression as shown in 
Table 2, based on which we use three alternative classifications to identify over-payers and 
under-payers. The Mid-point classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-payer if the 
residual ui,t is positive, as an under-payer if the residual ui,t is negative, and as a non-payer if 
there is no payout at year t. The Terciles classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-
payer if the residual ui,t is in the top tercile, as a moderate-payer if if the residual ui,t is in the 
middle tercile, as an under-payer
 
if the residual ui,t is in the lower tercile, and as a non-payer if 
there is no payout at year t. The Persistent classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-
payer if the residual ui,t is positive over three consecutive years, as an under-payer if the residual 
ui,t is negative over three consecutive years, as a non-payer if there is no payout over three 
consecutive years, and all other payers are labelled as unclassified.  
 
  N Mean payout yield Mean predicted payout yield 
    
Mid-point classification    
Non-payers 35,617 0.0000 0.0152 
Under-payers 23,740 0.0181 0.0354 
Over-payers 17,035 0.0764 0.0313 
    
Terciles classification    
Non-payers 35,617 0.0000 0.0152 
Under-payers 13,592 0.0158 0.0408 
Moderate-payers 13,592 0.0243 0.0287 
Over-payers 13,591 0.0874 0.0317 
    
Persistent classification    
Non-payers 13,718 0.0000 0.0000 
Under-payers 7,714 0.0202 0.0174 
Unclassified 19,876 0.0338 0.0171 
Over-payers 3,932 0.0757 0.0589 
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Table 4. Total payout and financial distress. 
This table presents the average values for a range of financial distress variables for all US-listed firms during 1975-2008. We exclude financial 
firms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and securities other than common stock. The average values and the differences in means 
are reported for each firm type based on three alternative classifications. The Mid-point classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-payer if 
the residual ui,t is positive, as an under-payer if the residual ui,t is negative, and as a non-payer if there is no payout at year t. The Terciles 
classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-payer if the residual ui,t is in the top tercile, as a moderate-payer if if the residual ui,t is in the 
middle tercile, as an under-payer
 
if the residual ui,t is in the lower tercile, and as a non-payer if there is no payout at year t. The Persistent 
classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-payer if the residual ui,t is positive over three consecutive years, as an under-payer if the residual 
ui,t is negative over three consecutive years, as a non-payer if there is no payout over three consecutive years, and all other payers are labelled as 
unclassified. All financial distress variables, except binary variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
Non-
payers 
(1) 
Under-
payers 
(2) 
Moderate/ 
Unclassified 
Payers (3) 
Over-
payers (4) Difference in means 
 
    (1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (1) vs (4) (2) vs (3) (2) vs (4) (3) vs (4) 
Interest Coverage 
Mid-point: 2.0039 2.2905 - 2.2311 -0.287*** - -0.227*** - 0.0594*** - 
Terciles: 2.0039 2.2862 2.2933 2.2185  -0.282*** -0.289*** -0.215*** -0.0071 0.0678*** 0.0749*** 
Persistent 1.9627 2.3334 2.1490 2.2089 -0.371*** -0.186***    -0.246***  0.184***  0.125***  -0.0599** 
Z-Score - Dummy 
Mid-point: 0.7602 0.9309 - 0.8916 -0.171*** - -0.131*** - 0.0393*** - 
Terciles: 0.7602 0.9410 0.9138 0.8887 -0.181*** -0.154***  -0.129*** 0.0272***  0.0522***    0.0250*** 
Persistent 0.7608 0.9514 0.8740 0.9293 -0.191*** -0.113***   -0.168***   0.0774***  0.0221*** -0.0553*** 
Zmijewski-score 
Mid-point: -0.7496 -1.6523 - -1.4162 0.903*** - 0.667*** - -0.236*** - 
Terciles: -0.7496 -1.6733 -1.5766 -1.4110 0.924***  0.827***  0.661***    -0.0967*** -0.262*** -0.166*** 
Persistent -0.7975 -1.7239 -1.3454 -1.4641 0.926*** 0.548***  0.667*** -0.378***  -0.260***      0.119*** 
O-score 
Mid-point: -2.8327 -4.7988 - -4.2644 1.966*** - 1.432*** - -0.534*** - 
Terciles: -2.8327 -5.0052 -4.4540 -4.2674   2.172***  1.621***   1.435***  -0.551***  -0.738*** -0.187*** 
Persistent -3.0237 -5.1388 -4.1763 -4.4103 2.115*** 1.153*** 1.387*** -0.963***  -0.729***  0.234*** 
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Default probability 
Mid-point: 10.455 2.2553 - 5.3088 8.200*** - 5.146*** - -3.053*** - 
Terciles: 10.4549 1.6663 3.2324 5.6943 8.789***  7.222*** 4.761*** -1.566***   -4.028*** -2.462*** 
Persistent 10.6421 1.4443 6.1954 3.6118 9.198*** 4.447*** 7.030***  -4.751***  -2.167*** 2.584*** 
Default probability (CHS) 
Mid-point: 3.4090 0.3071  1.2473 3.102***  2.162*** - -0.940*** - 
Terciles: 3.4090 0.1224 0.7129 1.2644  3.287***     2.696***   2.145*** -0.591***  -1.142***  -0.551*** 
Persistent 2.9931 0.1344 1.2070 0.5716 2.859*** 1.786***  2.421***  -1.073***  -0.437*** 0.635*** 
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Table 5. Total payout and firm survival. 
This table presents the average values for a range of firm survival variables for all US-listed firms during 1975-2013. We exclude financial firms 
(SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and securities other than common stock. As in Bhattacharya et al. (2015) we consider two types 
of delistings: voluntary and involuntary delistings. As voluntary delistings we consider firms that are involved in (a) mergers and acquisitions 
(Merger) and (b) Exchange Transactions. As involuntary delistings we consider firms that are (c) liquidated, where firms are forced to cease 
operations and sell their assets (Liquidation); (d) dropped from a stock exchange, where firms are dropped for reasons other than liquidation or 
voluntary delisting (Exchange dropped); and (e) a combination of firms that are liquidated or dropped from the exchange (Liquidation and 
Exchange dropped). The average firm survival values and the differences in means are reported for each firm type based on three alternative 
classifications. The Mid-point classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-payer if the residual ui,t is positive, as an under-payer if the residual 
ui,t is negative, and as a non-payer if there is no payout at year t. The Terciles classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-payer if the residual 
ui,t is in the top tercile, as a moderate-payer if if the residual ui,t is in the middle tercile, as an under-payer if the residual ui,t is in the lower tercile, 
and as a non-payer if there is no payout at year t. The Persistent classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-payer if the residual ui,t is positive 
over three consecutive years, as an under-payer
 
if the residual ui,t is negative over three consecutive years, as a non-payer if there is no payout over 
three consecutive years, and all other payers are labelled as unclassified. All firm survival variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
Non-
payers (1) 
Under-
payers 
(2) 
Moderate/ 
Unclassifie
d 
Payers 
(3) 
Over-
payers 
(4) 
Difference in means 
(1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (1) vs (4) (2) vs (3) (2) vs (4) (3) vs (4) 
 
Panel A. Voluntary delisting 
Merger and acquisition (year +5) 
Mid-point: 0.1873 0.1857  0.1893 0.0016  -0.002  -0.0036  
Terciles: 0.1873 0.1814 0.1898 0.1904 0.0059 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0084 -0.0090 -0.0006 
Persistent 0.1892 0.1667 0.1953 0.1798 0.0225*** -0.0061 0.0094 -0.0286*** -0.0131 0.0155* 
Exchange transaction (year +5) 
Mid-point: 0.0061 0.0125  0.0133 -0.00636***  -0.00718***  -0.00082  
Terciles: 0.0061 0.0121 0.0143 0.0121 -0.00592*** -0.00820*** -0.00599*** -0.0023 -0.0001 0.0022 
Persistent 0.0051 0.0131 0.0102 0.0160 -0.0079*** -0.00506*** -0.0109*** 0.00293* -0.0029 -0.00586** 
 
Panel B. Involuntary delisting 
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Liquidation (year +5) 
Mid-point: 0.0024 0.0027  0.0033 -0.0003  -0.0009  -0.00059  
Terciles: 0.0024 0.0025 0.0032 0.0032 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0000 
Persistent 0.0015 0.0023 0.0024 0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0004 0.0000 0.0013 0.00135* 
Exchange dropped (year +5) 
Mid-point: 0.2242 0.0487  0.0819 0.176***  0.142***  -0.0332***  
Terciles: 0.2242 0.0334 0.0717 0.0826 0.191*** 0.153*** 0.142*** -0.0383*** -0.0492*** -0.0109*** 
Persistent 0.2030 0.0239 0.0998 0.0509  0.179*** 0.103*** 0.152*** -0.0759***   -0.0270*** 0.0489*** 
Liquidation and Exchange dropped (year +5) 
Mid-point: 0.2242 0.0487  0.0819 0.176***  0.142***  -0.0332***  
Terciles: 0.2242 0.0334 0.0717 0.0826 0.191*** 0.153*** 0.142*** -0.0383*** -0.0492*** -0.0109*** 
Persistent 0.2030 0.0239 0.0998 0.0509  0.179*** 0.103*** 0.152*** -0.0759***   -0.0270*** 0.0489*** 
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Table 6. Covariate matching. 
This table reports the results on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for an array of financial distress variables and an involuntary 
delisting measure for all US-listed firms during 1975-2013. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and 
securities other than common stock. The mid-point classification is used for matching each firm year observation of an over-payer (treated) with 
a suitable under-payer (untreated), by using a one-to-one nearest neighbor covariate matching method with replacement. Non-payers are excluded 
from the matching process. Panel A reports the results on matching treated and untreated firms based on the expected level of payout (predicted). 
Panel B reports the results on matching treated and untreated firms based on the similarity of the firm specific characteristics (all controls), relying 
on the non-binary independent variables of the Tobit regression as shown in Table 2. All financial distress variables, except binary variables, are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails. All variables are defined in the Appendix. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Predicted 
No of treated=17,035; Bias before =  24.34236; Bias after =  0.000733 ATT t-stat 
 
  
Interest Coverage -0.0927*** (-5.557) 
Z-Score - Dummy -0.0283*** (-7.313) 
O-score 0.3316*** (12.212) 
Zmijewski-score 0.1723*** (8.999) 
Default probability 2.4781*** (13.345) 
Default probability (CHS) 0.7510*** (9.915) 
Liquidation and Exchange dropped (year +5) 0.0193*** (5.554) 
   
Panel B. All Controls 
No of treated=17,035; Bias before =  24.34236; Bias after =  2.424859 ATT t-stat 
 
  
Interest Coverage -0.0089 (-0.539) 
Z-Score - Dummy -0.0214*** (-5.477) 
O-score 0.1789*** (6.612) 
Zmijewski-score 0.1203*** (6.313) 
Default probability 1.4405*** (7.370) 
Default probability (CHS) 0.6539*** (8.451) 
Liquidation and Exchange dropped (year +5) 0.0121*** (3.394) 
40 
 
Table 7. Over-payers and under-payers: Sample overview 
This table presents summary statistics on the channels that explain the likelihood to over-pay (in table 8) for the reduced sample of over-payers 
and under-payers (i.e. excluding non-payers) based on the mid-point classification. The main data source is the CRSP / Compustat merged database 
of firm-level data for all US-listed firms during 1975-2008. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and 
securities other than common stock. Panel A reports the institutional ownership variables from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) 
GDWDEDVHDQG%ULDQ%XVKHH¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUFODVVLILFDWLRQV7KHPHDVXUHRILQYHVWRUWXUQRYHUDQGWKHFODVVLILFDWLRQVof low, moderate and 
high turnover are estimated as in Gaspar et al. (2012). All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails and are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Determinants of over-payers 
 
N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Institutional ownership 27,619  0.4134 0.4016 0.2665 0.0007 0.9523 
Investor turnover 27,619  0.1894 0.1878 0.0531 0.0446 0.4186 
Low turnover institutional ownership 27,619  0.0778 0.0588 0.0737 0.0000 0.3148 
Ownership of dedicated institutions 27,619  0.0561 0.0316 0.0669 0.0000 0.3026 
Ownership of quasi-indexer institutions 27,619  0.2738 0.2642 0.1827 0.0000 0.6761 
Dividend premium 18,641  -0.0947 -0.0780 0.0917 -0.3320 0.0320 
Industry propensity to overpay 18,641  0.4222 0.4222 0.1289 0.0000 1.0000 
City propensity to overpay 18,641  0.4177 0.4000 0.3091 0.0000 1.0000 
 
41 
 
Table 8. Determinants of over-paying. 
This table presents logit regression results on a panel data set of all US-listed firms during 1981-2008. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-
6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and securities other than common stock. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if firm i at year t is identified as an over-payer and 0 if it is identified as an under-payer based on the Mid-point classification. The Mid-point 
classification identifies firm i at year t as an over-payer if the residual ui,t is positive, as an under-payer if the residual ui,t is negative, and as a non-
payer if there is no payout at year t. The independent variables are a set of institutional ownership, peer-influence, and geographical-clustering 
variables. All variables, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails and are defined in the Appendix. Regressions include industry and year controls. 
Industries are defined using the Fama and French (1992) 49 industries classification. We use standard errors clustered by firm to accommodate 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm autocorrelation. Marginal effects are reported in brackets and robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Over-payers dummy 
                  
Institutional ownership -0.969*** -0.910*** -1.209*** -2.450*** -0.871*** -0.807*** -1.102*** -2.316*** 
 [-0.2293] [-0.2148] [-0.2855] [-0.5779] [-0.2032] [-0.1877] [-0.2567] [-0.5384] 
 (0.0816) (0.0829) (0.0942) (0.230) (0.0967) (0.0983) (0.112) (0.269) 
Investor turnover  -1.777***    -1.916***   
  [-0.4197]    [-0.4457]   
  (0.309)    (0.384)   
Low turnover institutional ownership   1.496***    1.484***  
   [0.3535]    [0.3456]  
   (0.330)    (0.401)  
Ownership of dedicated institutions    1.579***    1.524*** 
    [0.3725]    [0.3542] 
    (0.372)    (0.450) 
Ownership of quasi-indexer institutions    1.993***    1.966*** 
    [0.4700]    [0.4570] 
    (0.298)    (0.350) 
Dividend premium     2.726*** 2.994*** 2.670*** 2.722*** 
     [0.6354] [0.6966] [0.6217] [0.6327] 
     (0.545) (0.548) (0.545) (0.549) 
Industry propensity to overpay     1.535*** 1.514*** 1.527*** 1.514*** 
     [0.3579] [0.3523] [0.3555] [0.3519] 
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     (0.152) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) 
City propensity to overpay     0.0894* 0.0943* 0.0886* 0.0945* 
     [0.0208] [0.0220] [0.0206] [0.0220] 
     (0.0530) (0.0531) (0.0530) (0.0532) 
Constant -0.821** -0.609 -0.861** -0.840** -0.411 -0.124 -0.470 -0.372 
 (0.364) (0.375) (0.375) (0.370) (0.380) (0.401) (0.413) (0.368) 
         
Industry & Year controls 9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  
Observations 27,619 27,619 27,619 27,619 18,641 18,641 18,641 18,641 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.029 
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Appendix. Variable Definitions 
Payout variables Definitions 
Dividends  Common dividends (Compustat item DVC) over Market capitalization 
Repurchases  Purchase of common and preferred stock (Compustat item PRSTKC) 
minus the reduction in the book value of preferred stock (Compustat item 
PSTKRV), all scaled by Market capitalization 
Total payout  Sum of Dividends and Repurchases  
Market capitalization Market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat item PRCC 
times item CSHO) 
 
 
Payout determinants Definitions 
Cash flow Operating income before depreciation (Compustat item OIBDP) over 
total assets (Compustat item AT) 
Preferred stock Preferred stock is the liquidating value of preferred stock (Compustat 
item PSTKL) or the redemption value of preferred stock (Compustat 
item PSTKRV) or the par value of preferred stock (Compustat item 
PSTK). If items PSTKL, PSTKRV, and PSTV are not available, 
preferred stock is set to zero 
Book equity Book equity is stockholders' equity (Compustat item SEQ) or book 
common equity (Compustat item CEQ) plus book preferred stock 
(Compustat item PSTK) or total assets (Compustat item AT) minus total 
liabilities (Compustat item LT), minus Preferred stock, plus deferred 
taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat item TXDITC), if available, 
minus the postretirement benefit asset (Compustat item PRBA), if 
available 
Firm market value Total assets (Compustat item AT) minus Book equity plus Market 
capitalization 
Market-to-book Firm market value over total assets (Compustat item AT)                           
Firm size Natural log of inflation-adjusted Market capitalization (using the 
consumer price index CPIAUCSL from FRED) 
Leverage Long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT) plus long-term debt due in one 
year (Compustat item DD1) over Firm market value 
Retained earnings Retained earnings (Compustat item RE) over total assets (Compustat 
item AT) 
Cash holdings Cash and short-term investments (Compustat item CHE) over total assets 
(Compustat item AT) 
Idiosyncratic risk Standard deviation of the residuals from a regression of the daily stock 
return (source: CRSP) in excess of the risk free rate (from Prof. Kenneth 
French's website) on the market factor based on the value-weighted 
market return (source: CRSP). Daily returns over the fiscal year are used 
Systematic risk Standard deviation of the predicted value from a regression of the daily 
stock return (source: CRSP) in excess of the risk free rate (from Prof. 
Kenneth French's website) on the market factor based on the value-
weighted market return (source: CRSP). Daily returns over the fiscal 
year are used 
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Firm age Years since the firm's first appearance in CRSP 
 
 
Financial distress 
variables 
Definitions 
Interest coverage Natural log of one plus the sum of interest expenses (Compustat item 
XINT) and operating income after depreciation (Compustat item 
OIADP) over interest expenses. The variable is set to missing if 
operating income after depreciation is not positive 
Z-score ± Dummy  
 
$ELQDU\YDULDEOHWKDWHTXDOVRQHLI$OWPDQ¶V]-score is higher 
than 1.81 and zero otherwise. The z-score is computed as follows:  
Z-score = 3.3 * (item OIADP / item AT) + 1.2 * ((item ACT - item LCT) 
/ item AT) + item SALE / item AT + 0.6 * ((item CSHO * item PRCC) 
/ (item DLTT + item DLC)) + 1.4 * (item RE / item AT). All items are 
from Compustat 
Zmijewski-score  -4.336 - 4.513 * (item NI / item AT) + 5.679 * (item LT / item AT) + 
0.004 * (item ACT / item LCT)   
All items are from Compustat 
Funds from operations Total funds from operations (Compustat item FOPT) or cash flow from 
operating activities (Compustat item OANCF)  minus increase in 
accounts payable and accrued liabilities (Compustat item APALCH) 
minus decrease in inventory (Compustat item INVCH) minus decrease 
in accounts receivable (Compustat item RECCH) minus increase in 
accrued income taxes (Compustat item TXACH) minus net increase in 
other liabilities (Compustat item AOLOCH) 
Change in net income Change in net income (Compustat item NI) over the sum of the absolute 
values of the current and lagged net income 
O-score  -1.32 - 0.407 * log((item AT * 1,000,000) / GNP price-level index) + 
6.03 * (item LT / item AT) - 1.43 * ((item ACT - item LCT) / item AT) 
+ 0.076 * (item LCT / item ACT) - 1.72 * Negative equity dummy - 2.37 
* (item NI / item AT) - 1.83 * (Funds from operations / item LT) + 0.285 
* Dummy losses - 0.521 * Change in net income       
All items are from Compustat. The GNP price-level index is from FRED 
and is set to 100 for the year 1968  
Dummy losses Binary variable that equals one if the sum of the current and lagged net 
income (Compustat item NI) is negative. Otherwise, it equals zero 
Negative equity dummy Binary variable equals one if total liabilities (Compustat item LT) are 
larger than total assets (Compustat item AT). Otherwise, it equals zero 
Distance to default Bharath and Shumway's (2008) Merton's distance to default measure 
Default probability N(- Distance to default) * 100 
CHS-score Score computed using the coefficients from Column 4 in Table IV of 
Campbell et al. (2008) 
Default probability (CHS) (1 / (1 + exp(- CHS-score))) * 100 
 
 
Firm survival variables Definitions 
Merger and acquisition 
(year +5) 
Binary variable that equals one if the stock is delisted due to a merger 
(source: CRSP delisting codes 200-290) in the subsequent 5 calendar 
year(s). Otherwise, it equals zero 
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Exchange transaction (year 
+5) 
Binary variable that equals one if the stock is delisted due to an exchange 
transaction (source: CRSP delisting codes 300-390) in the subsequent 5 
calendar year(s). Otherwise, it equals zero 
Liquidation (year +5) Binary variable that equals one if the stock is delisted due to a liquidation 
(source: CRSP delisting codes 400-490) in the subsequent 5 calendar 
year(s). Otherwise, it equals zero 
Exchange Dropped (year 
+5) 
Binary variable that equals one if the stock is delisted due to being 
dropped from the exchange (source: CRSP delisting codes 500-591) in 
the subsequent 5 calendar year(s). Otherwise, it equals zero 
Liquidation and Exchange 
dropped (year +5) 
Binary variable that equals one if the stock is delisted due to being 
liquidated or dropped from the exchange (source: CRSP delisting codes 
400-490 or 500-591) in the subsequent 5 calendar year(s). Otherwise, it 
equals zero 
 
 
Institutional ownership 
variables 
Definitions 
Institutional ownership Fraction of common shares outstanding held by institutional investors 
(source: Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database) 
Investor turnover Gaspar et al.'s (2012) investor turnover measure (source: Thomson 
Reuters Institutional Holdings database) 
Low turnover institutional 
ownership 
Ownership of low turnover institutional investors defined as in Gaspar et 
al. (2012) (source: Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database) 
Mid turnover institutional 
ownership 
Ownership of mid turnover institutional investors defined as in Gaspar 
et al. (2012) (source: Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database) 
High turnover institutional 
ownership 
Ownership of high turnover institutional investors defined as in Gaspar 
et al. (2012) (source: Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database) 
Ownership of dedicated 
institutions 
Ownership of dedicated institutions (sources: classifications from Prof. 
Brian Bushee's website; Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
database) 
Ownership of quasi-indexer 
institutions 
Ownership of quasi-indexer institutions (sources: classifications from 
Prof. Brian Bushee's website; Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
database) 
Dividend Premium The annual difference in the logarithm of the value-weighted market-to-
book ratio (M/B) of dividend payers and non-payers (Kulchania, 2013). 
Buyback Premium The annual difference in the logarithm of the value-weighted market-to-
book ratio (M/B) of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms 
(Kulchania, 2013).  
Industry propensity to 
overpay 
The annual average value of the over-payer binary variable for firm-year 
observations from the same industry based on Fama and French (1997) 
49 industries, excluding the firm under consideration.  
City propensity to overpay The annual average value of the over-payer binary variable for firm-year 
observations from firms headquartered in the same city (based on data 
from Compustat), excluding the firm under consideration. 
 
